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The language used to talk about death determina-tion has been repeatedly reformulated. Examples include “brain death,” to describe the condition 
of patients who were in “coma dépassé”;1 consecutive ad-
justments in the language used to refer to the practices 
known early on as “non-heart-beating donation” (later 
as “donation after cardiac death,” then as “donation af-
ter circulatory death,” and then finally as “donation after 
circulatory determination of death”2); and proposals to 
replace “irreversible cessation” with “permanent cessation” 
to support controlled donation after circulatory determi-
nation of death (DCDD) protocols.3 Despite objections, 
these changes to language have entered or are entering 
into academic jargon, professional guidelines, and inter-
national regulations. The language seems, in part, to pro-
mote organ donation but also helps physicians formally 
avoid violations of the dead donor rule.4
Since the early 1980s, James Bernat has played a leading 
role in shaping both scholarly discourse and policy-mak-
ing about death determination and organ procurement. 
His scientific contributions may be indirectly responsible 
for having extended the life expectancy and the quality of 
life of thousands of people around the world. However, 
the conceptual reformulations he and others have pro-
posed have had intellectual and practical costs. Critics ar-
gue that linguistic gerrymandering, semantic contortions, 
and legal fictions reveal more concern for pragmatic goals 
than for truth.5 The effort also creates confusion among 
the public, the media, and even health professionals.6 It 
also raises practical objections concerning the respect for 
and protection of donors and their families.
In this issue of the Report, Bernat proposes an innova-
tive and sophisticated distinction to justify the introduc-
tion of permanent cessation as a valid substitute standard 
for irreversible cessation in death determination. He dif-
ferentiates two approaches to conceptualizing and deter-
mining death: the biological concept and the prevailing 
medical practice standard. While irreversibility is required 
by the biological concept, the weaker criterion of perma-
nence, he claims, has always sufficed in the accepted stan-
dard medical practice to declare death. Bernat argues that 
the medical practice standard may be acceptable on the 
ground that proving circulatory or brain permanence is 
sufficient to assure complete accuracy for death diagnosis.
We doubt that permanence has been and in practice 
is sufficient for declaring death. In fact, we suspect that 
Bernat himself finds it insufficient. Why else does he 
discourage the use of extracorporeal membrane oxygen-
ation in DCDD? Donors who are declared dead accord-
ing to the permanence standard may recover neurological 
functions, including consciousness, when ECMo is in-
troduced to preserve their organs.7 To prevent that, a bal-
loon is customarily inserted to occlude the aorta and to 
restrict circulation to the abdomen. Such an intervention 
has been recommended to ensure that permanent loss of 
neurological function becomes irreversible8 and to avoid 
the disturbing risk—hypothetical though it might be—of 
enabling first-person experiences of vital organ retrieval. 
Rejecting the use of ECMo is evidence, in our view, that 
one is uncomfortable with permanence alone.
Bernat also claims that irreversibility would produce 
unjustified harms to patients and their family members 
with no countervailing benefits. It is somewhat paradoxi-
cal to claim that a stronger criterion for certifying death 
would entail less protection than a weaker one. By itself, 
calling donors “dead” by the “permanence” standard 
when they have not yet irreversibly lost the capacity for 
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consciousness hardly increases their chances of getting ap-
propriate protection and respectful care. In fact, it might 
have the opposite effect, as doctors are not supposed to 
sedate cadavers or require their explicit consent to initi-
ate certain interventions intended strictly to preserve their 
organs.9 If the objective is to respect and protect donors, 
wouldn’t it be better to make sure they had given consent 
for donation and that they are beyond harm?10
Bernat overlooks what seems to us the most compel-
ling reason to support the permanence standard: to pro-
mote DCDD organ procurement without violating the 
dead donor rule. Bernat has claimed elsewhere that “vio-
lating the DDR is misguided and will lead fearful patients 
to lose trust in physicians and confidence in the organ-
donation system and will result in an overall decline in 
organ donation.”11 In truth, if we are to continue with 
organ donation while honoring the DDR, there is no 
choice to be made between permanence and irreversibil-
ity: by the time biological death is a certainty in a DCDD 
protocol, the organs have deteriorated too much for 
transplantation. The real choice is between “respecting” 
the dead donor rule (by bending the criteria of death) 
and devising more sophisticated and transparent ways of 
protecting patients (for example, acknowledging that do-
nors may not be fully dead when organs are retrieved and 
using anaesthesia for organ retrieval with their consent).
Shaping language in a way that hides the normative 
questions at stake undercuts public understanding. Lay 
people are less likely to debate claims that experts pres-
ent as simple “facts” (“DCDD donors are dead”) rather 
than as normative claims. This creates a concern about 
the public legitimacy of deceased organ donation: invok-
ing the interest society has in not violating the dead donor 
rule without letting society participate in these debates 
could be considered a form of paternalistic expertocracy.
Bernat claims that any policy solution to this debate 
“should engender broad support among health profes-
sionals and the public by being conceptually coherent, 
physiologically plausible, and socially acceptable.” He 
argues that, given the lack of public outcry, “death dec-
laration at permanent cessation has been well accepted 
by society,” even though “the public is probably mostly 
unaware of the practice.” We believe that the absence of a 
public outcry can hardly be considered evidence of soci-
etal acceptance for a position that is surrounded by com-
plexity, confusion, and lack of transparency.12
The topic requires public deliberation: processes to 
survey people’s opinions and mechanisms to channel 
their opinions into policy-making. What is at stake is 
the nature of our society. Do we want an expertocracy, in 
which an enlightened few design policies for the greater 
good of the majority and exploit the lack of public knowl-
edge to achieve compliance? or a deliberative democracy, 
where transparency is nonnegotiable and people have the 
right not only to know what happens behind the expert 
curtains but also to voice their views on public policies 
and to press for their will to be carried out?
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Not letting society participate in debates about the dead donor 
rule could be seen as a form of paternalistic expertocracy.
